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1. INTRODUCTION
Political violence between rival fractions is as old as human history. The death toll of 
rivalling groups settling scores on the battlefield instead of the negotiation table has been 
particularly heavy in the 20th century. Politically motivated violence has led to two World 
Wars, several dozen episodes of mass killings of civilians, devastating purges carried out by 
a series of totalitarian regimes, as well as dozens of recurrent ethnic civil wars. Most 
recently, the resurgence of terrorism has hit the headlines as major preoccupation. All in all, 
conflict-related violence has resulted in over 100 million human lives lost in the 20th century 
alone. Given the striking extent of armed violence, it is not surprising that wars are a major 
obstacle to growth and development, with roughly two thirds of the world’s poorest 
countries having been held back by conflict in recent decades (one of course has to bear in 
mind that causality runs both ways – wars make countries poorer and poorer countries are 
more likely to be dragged into a war) (see the survey article of Rohner, 2016, for the sources 
of the above computations and Mueller et al., 2017, for a discussion of the economic costs)1. 
Not only the escalation of conflict between rivalling factions has shaped human history, but 
also the quest for solutions to avoid fighting has been centuries old. One promising idea 
reaching far back has been to share power. A powerful illustration of the potential virtues of 
power-sharing constitutes the Swiss Constitution of 1848. Switzerland, a highly 
linguistically and religiously polarized country, experienced a civil war in 1847 between the 
liberal Protestant forces, pushing for the building of a nation-state, and the conservative 
Catholic militias, wanting to maintain a loose defensive alliance without further integration. 
The victorious Protestants had the wise idea to put in place a system that in many accounts 
gives more than proportional blocking power to their defeated rivals. In particular, the new 
1848 Constitution established a nation state based on wide-ranging principles of power-
sharing with a coalition government, proportional election system, federalist 
decentralisation, bicameralism, and direct democracy. The Catholic cantons (i.e. provinces) 
rapidly obtained proportional representation in the government and de facto veto power for 
all major decisions. There has been peace ever since.
2
 While the whole context matters and 
one has of course to be careful when applying lessons from 19
th
 century Switzerland to 
today’s conflicts, the success of Swiss post-conflict reconstruction still suggests that power 
sharing could also be part of the solution in many of the current conflicts like Iraq, Libya 
and South Sudan. 
Much anecdotal evidence and journalist accounts suggest a potentially important role for 
power-sharing to curb conflict, and there is a clear tendency for some ethnically or 
religiously divided countries to adopt some power-sharing: As shown in the qualitative work 
of Lijphart (1999), many successful and peaceful ethnically and religiously divided 
countries chose the so-called "Consensus Model of Democracy" characterized by power-
1 There is also work showing some positive effects of war, e.g. Voigtländer and Voth (2013). 
2 One of course needs to bear in mind that in electoral systems where the government composition does not react strongly to 
electoral outcomes this may lower the accountability of the government. 
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sharing and the decentralization of power on all levels. Still, while historical examples tell 
us that several ethnically and politically divided countries adopted power-sharing and that 
this correlates with peace and prosperity, this is a long way from showing systematic 
statistical evidence that the adoption of power-sharing results in a reduction of the risk of 
conflict. In fact, there is surprisingly little hard, statistical evidence linking power-sharing to 
peace. As discussed in detail in the literature review below, there indeed only exists very 
little theoretical and empirical work that links specific political institutions to the onset of 
conflicts at the micro level. 
 
To address this shortcoming in the existing literature, in this paper we shall study the impact 
of power-sharing on the risk of conflict. First, we will—to fix ideas—discuss the theoretical 
rationale for why one should expect power-sharing to foster peace. The argument takes into 
account the incentives for election losers to leave regular politics and take up arms. The 
incentives to do so vary widely with the achieved majorities. In a system with one-party-
government where even a narrow majority provides extensive powers, an ethnic or religious 
group defeated at the polls may benefit from very little protection and may have strong 
incentives to leave the realm of constitutional electoral competition for power. On the 
contrary, in a system with proportional representation and a grand coalition government 
where electoral winners and losers are both represented in the government, the actual 
difference in payoffs after winning versus losing an election are very slim, hence the outside 
option of rebellion is not very attractive. Take again as example the Swiss system, where the 
seat composition of the Swiss coalition government has always included all major factions 
of the political landscape and has been extremely slow moving. The greatest stability has 
been between 1959-2003 where the so-called “magic formula” has attributed a fixed number 
of seats to all major parties in the seven-minister government with an annually rotating 
presidency. Thus, in this period, whether a party won the election with a landslide victory or 
experienced a crushing electoral defeat did not affect at all the government composition. 
While the stability of such a power-sharing system may be a bit stark, it has the virtue that 
incentives of electoral losers to leave the realm of parliamentary politics have been reduced 
to a minimum.  
 
After the discussion of the underlying theory, as a next step, we will use very disaggregated 
data from Northern Ireland. Using data on the identity of chairmen in district councils we 
define power-sharing at the local level as a situation where none of the sectarian parties
3
 
holds both chairs. We then see whether this local power-sharing has reduced the scope for 
violence during the past decades. When –after a period of relative calm– sectarian violence 
between Catholic Republicans and Protestant Unionists (also called Loyalists) exploded in 
1969, the idea to put in place power-sharing agreements across frontlines rapidly arose, and 
in the 1970s already several local district governments experimented with sharing power 
between Catholic and Protestant parties. There was an up and down and the frequency of 
such local power-sharing governments fluctuated considerably across time and space over 
                                                          
3 By “sectarian party” we understand parties clearly linked to the Catholic or Protestant cause, as opposed to non-sectarian 
parties that attract voters across the board and focus on issues unrelated to the catholic-protestant conflict. 
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the following decades. While any statistical evidence on the success of these initiatives is 
lacking, casual observation suggested a positive impact, which paved the way to scale up the 
sharing of power to the national level, culminating in the famous nationwide “Good Friday 
Agreement” agreed upon on the 10 April 1998 in Belfast.4 The agreement devolved powers 
back to Northern Ireland with the explicit aim to ensure power-sharing and inclusivity.  
 
In Figure 1 we provide a first look at our measure of violence, fatalities caused by the 
conflict (described in more detail below). Since the beginning of multi-party talks in June 
1996 preparing the ground for the “Good Friday Agreement” and in the aftermath of its 
signature there has been a noticeable drop in violence, as shown clearly in the Figure. While 
before 1995 the level of violence fluctuated considerably on a relatively high level, after 
1995 it dropped sharply with the exception of one outlier (a bombing on the 15 August 1998 
in Omagh, County Tyrone). This negative correlation between devolution, i.e. power-
sharing, and violence could of course be spurious and driven by all kinds of omitted factors, 
which calls for an econometric analysis at the local level.  
 
Figure 1.  Evolution of fatalities in the Northern Ireland conflict 
 
Thus, to move beyond such aggregate correlations and investigate in depth whether local 
power-sharing had an actual impact on the number of fatalities is precisely the purpose of 
the current article. In particular, we shall investigate whether local power-sharing might 
                                                          



















1975m1 1980m1 1985m1 1990m1 1995m1 2000m1
time
CAN POWER-SHARING FOSTER PEACE? 
 
5 
have caused a subsequent drop in violence at the local level, despite the often chaotic and 
controversial attempts at higher levels of government. For this purpose, we have put 
together a panel dataset of 26 local district councils between 1973 and 2001. While in some 
of the figures we make use of monthly data, our main unit of observation in the regression 
analysis is a given year in a given council district, with our explanatory variable of interest 
being shared power across sectarian lines in the council in this given moment of time. We 
identify shared power through a novel dataset of the identity of all chairmen and vice 
chairmen in the councils (in particular, we measure power-sharing as dummy variable taking 
a value of 1 when the chairman and vice-chairman in a given district are not from the same 
political block). Our dependent variable that we want to explain is the number of conflict-
related casualties per capita registered in a given district council and year. While we start by 
using simple regressions to establish the stylized facts, we shall swiftly move to a more 
advanced econometric analysis where we take into account the concern that there may be 
omitted, confounding factors that affect both the appeal of power-sharing and the reduction 
in violence. The presence of open-minded and consensual party leaders in a given district 
could, for example, make power-sharing more likely and could at the same time ease 
sectarian tensions, leading to a drop in fatalities in this district.  
 
As described below, we shall address this concern by exploiting an identification strategy 
based on random variation close to the electoral majority threshold. In particular, we will 
compare situations where sectarian parties barely achieve the absolute majority (hence 
reducing strongly the incentives for forming a “grand coalition”) with situations that are ex-
ante very comparable but where sectarian parties narrowly miss the absolute majority, 
making it much more appealing to engage in power-sharing (with the alternative being a 
large potential for political blockade). After establishing these main results of the paper we 
shall provide a series of robustness checks, before assessing what demographic factors 
reduce or magnify the impact of power-sharing.  
 
This article is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a review of existing work, showing 
how the current results contribute to addressing a shortcoming in the existing literature. In 
Section 3 the main argument is explained in some detail, while Section 4 is devoted to the 
discussion of the context and the data of Northern Ireland. Section 5 provides the main 
results and Section 6 the various robustness checks, while Section 7 studies channels of 
transmission (i.e. what factors reduce or magnify our main impact). Section 8 concludes. 
Non-technical and time-pressed readers may focus on Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Political openness and consensual politics have been linked to desirable outcomes such as 
prosperity and peace in the existing literature. In particular, there is influential recent work 
linking consensual institutions (Lijphart, 1999) or inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and 
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Robinson, 2012) to prosperity. Further, there is some work arguing that democracy in 
general could reduce the civil war risk by reducing grievances (Gurr, 1971).  
 
Still, most empirical papers find that the effects of democracy are ambiguous, as on the one 
hand it reduces grievances by enhancing accountability, but on the other hand freedom of 
speech and assembly facilitate insurgency. Unsurprisingly, there is evidence for an "inverted 
U-shape", i.e. "anocracies" with intermediate democracy scores fare worst (Hegre et al., 
2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Collier and Rohner (2008) find that in poor countries the 
conflict-fuelling effects of democracy dominate, while in rich countries the peace-promoting 
channels take the upper hand. There is also cross-country pooled panel evidence that the rule 
of law, proportional representation and federalism correlate with a lower conflict risk 
(Easterly, 2001; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Saideman et al, 2002). Moreover, Besley and Persson 
(2010, 2011) have emphasized the role of institutional constraints for peace by dealing with 
economic shocks. Recent evidence on ethnic favouritism suggests that political institutions 
can indeed play an important role in preventing the lopsided distribution of public resources 
(Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015). However, there are only few 
contributions linking specific political institutions at the micro level to the risk of violence. 
 
As far as stricto sensu power-sharing is concerned, there is a growing interest in 
understanding it better.
5
 There are, however, only very few contributions showing that 
groups included in government show less propensity to engage in insurgency (Cederman 
and Girardin, 2007; Cederman et al., 2013). Using the same data, Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2016) show that groups which are split by a national boundary are much more 
likely to be politically discriminated by the central state. They also argue that political 
discrimination could form part of the link between partitioned groups and violence. While 
this work on power-sharing and conflict represents a big leap forward, it has still a series of 
shortcomings: First of all, a group's power access status is hand-coded by experts (rather 
than drawn from administrative records). Second, the analysis is restricted to pooled-panel 
comparisons of different groups, and does not make use of exogenous within-group changes 
of power access over time. Third, the data is relatively aggregate, i.e. on the country or 
ethnic group level, making not use of fine-grained spatial information. 
 
There are several gaps in the literature that we shall address in the current paper: After 
making the theoretical argument of why we expect power-sharing to reduce the scope for 
conflict, we will provide the first analysis of the power-sharing - conflict nexus that i) uses 
spatially disaggregate data, ii) uses data which allows us to identify the perpetrators of 
violence, iii) codes local power-sharing measures from administrative records, iv) runs panel 
regressions with a large number of fixed effects for 28 years and 26 district councils, and v) 
makes use of quasi random variation in election outcomes in a subset of politically balanced 
districts. 
 
                                                          
5 See Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (2015) for a recent review. 
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3. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
In this section, we shall explain the intuition linking power-sharing to conflict. Picture 
yourself a country or a local district with two rival ethnic or religious groups. To fix ideas, 
call them Catholics and Protestants. There are democratic elections, after which a new 
government is sworn into office. Each of the population groups has the choice of either 
participating to electoral politics and accepting the verdict of the ballot polls or, 
alternatively, opt out, take up arms, and try to win (part of) political power by other means, 
i.e. engage in conflict. 
 
When making the choice of staying in electoral politics or not, the parties anticipate the 
opportunity cost of leaving the democratic process. In the absence of a power-sharing 
coalition government the loser of elections may remain almost empty-handed. If ethnic or 
religious mobilisation is along party lines and a given group is slightly smaller than its 
opponent, say, has 40% of the population, in the absence of power-sharing it may end up 
with only little political say. When access to executive power so crudely deviates from the 
demographic composition of the population, the group being an empty-handed loser of the 
ballot has rather powerful incentives to not stay in the realm of constitutional politics, but to 




While in most (developed and developing) former British colonies power-sharing 
governments are absent (e.g. USA, Zimbabwe), in several multi-ethnic or multi-linguistic 
European democracies power-sharing agreements take frequently place (e.g. Switzerland, 
Belgium, Netherlands) and are supported by proportional representation and a tradition of 
coalition governments. In such a system of shared executive power, a minority group can 
obtain a share of parliamentary seats and minister posts much closer to its population share, 
making thus the fact of sticking to electoral politics much more attractive – even for the 
loser.  
 
Thus, in a nutshell, while with a one-party government the loser may –especially in an 
ethnically or religiously divided country– have strong incentives to abandon the ballot for 
the bomb, in a consensual system with power-sharing both the winner and the loser have 
incentives to stick to electoral politics. This logic applies both to power-sharing at the 
national as well as at the local level. 
 
Importantly, in practice power-sharing has two elements, proportional representation (PR) 
and coalition governments. This means that there is a grey-scale of more or less power-
sharing. At the “no power-sharing” extreme there is majoritarian representation with one-
party governments, in the middle-ground there is PR (which already makes parliamentary 
seats proportional to group size) but the government is formed by a single party, while on 
the “full power-sharing” extreme there is PR and a coalition government. Given that since 
                                                          
6 The argument here is therefore akin to the role played by constitutional constraints in Besley and Persson (2011) which 
prevent rent extraction by the group in power and therefore numb incentives to capture power violently. 
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1973 local elections in Northern Ireland use a PR system with Single Transferable Vote 
(STV),
7
 the level of power-sharing observed in given districts and months varies between 
the middle-ground and full power-sharing. 
 
4. CONTEXT AND DATA OF NORTHERN IRELAND 
4.1. The Context 
To study the impact of power-sharing on peace, Northern Ireland is ideally suited. It is a rare 
example of a developed area experiencing an intense conflict and provides a unique setting 
that allows us to match detailed conflict events location data with fine-grained census data 
on the exact number of members from different religious groups. 
 
The Northern part of Ireland, Ulster, has been religiously divided since its conquest by 
England and the Reformation, taking both place in the 16th century. Since then the Catholic 
population from Gaelic Irish origin and the Protestant population of English and Scottish 
settlers have lived "separate lives" characterized by very stable patterns of land holdings and 
relatively few religiously mixed marriages (Mulholland, 2002; Fernihough, Grada and 
Walsh, 2015). When the Republic of Ireland achieved independence from Britain in 1919, 
the six Northern counties of Ireland remained part of the UK. The political divide persisted 
between the Catholic Nationalists (also called Republicans) who wanted to join the Republic 
of Ireland and the Protestant Unionists (also called Loyalists) who wanted to remain united 
with the UK. In 1968 the situation became confrontational when the Civil Rights 
Movements asked for more rights for Catholic citizens. Some of the initially peaceful 
demonstrations and marches were met with repression and resulted in fatalities. From 
August 1969 onwards sectarian violence exploded. 
 
The existing literature by Northern Ireland specialists points out the potential role of 
gerrymandering and under-representation of Catholics in the political process, and in the 
administration and police force. The "Orange marches" have also been highlighted as 
potential factor of escalation. In order to contain the violence, the government put in place a 
series of measures: Military measures, such as the building of a stronger Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), aimed at militarily weakening the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In 
the same vein, the construction of so-called "peace walls" (i.e. barriers) at sensitive ward 
borders aimed at containing sectarian violence through segregation. However, also various 
political initiatives to address grievances were lauched, such as the redistricting of formerly 
gerrymandered electoral districts, and bottom-up initiatives of decentralized, local power-
sharing at the level of the 26 regional district councils (which we shall exploit in the current 
                                                          
7 For a description of the electoral system in Northern Ireland, see 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/electoralsystem.htm. 
CAN POWER-SHARING FOSTER PEACE? 
 
9 
paper) that culminated in the 1998 "Good Friday agreement" which installed nation-wide 
large-scale power-sharing. This agreement was followed by a steep decline in violence. 
 
As far as formal political institutions are concerned, from June 1921 to March 1972 
Northern Ireland had its own parliament and government within the UK, the “Parliament of 
Northern Ireland”. The system derived from the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, which 
was designed to set up parliaments in both parts of Ireland. However, according to 
Carmichael and Knox (2004), Northern Ireland was never envisaged as a shared political 
entity, and from its foundation in 1921 until the suspension of Stormont in 1972, the Ulster 
Unionists won a majority at every election and formed the Government of Northern Ireland, 
making no attempt to share power with Catholics. In the wake of a massive outbreak of 
violence, the Stormont parliament was suspended and the British Government assumed 
direct control of Northern Ireland in March 1972. 
 
The local government system in Northern Ireland was established following the Local 
Government (NI) Act (1972). The act stipulated that every district council was to consist of 
members which were elected by the local electors and of whom one was to be chairman and 
another vice-chairman. Under the act, local government districts had three basic roles: an 
executive role, a representative role and a consultative role. Their executive role involved 
the provision of a limited range of services, such as environmental health, cleansing, 
recreation and economic development. The councils' representative role involved 
nominating local councilors to act as members of various statutory boards. They were 
consulted by government department officials on the operation of regional services in their 
area. 
 
According to Knox (1996), the relatively minor role of local government is illustrated by a 
net expenditure budget of £192m from a total public expenditure purse of £8 billion in the 
mid-1990s. However, Knox and Carmichael (1998) argue that council chambers became the 
mechanism for the expression of political opinions often well beyond the ambit of their 
direct powers. Local authorities were indeed important because they remained the only 
democratically elected forum in Northern Ireland after the demise of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. Secondly, in the absence of any devolved government, councillors were 
important access points for constituents with concerns about education, health, housing and 
other mainstream services. Put differently, the role of local councillors assumed an 
importance beyond the narrow confines of their direct responsibilities and they frequently 
mediated between constituents and central service providers. Thirdly, councils employed 
about 9,000 people, which mattered in an economy with high unemployment rates such as 
Northern Ireland. 
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4.2. The Data 
In what follows, we shall discuss the main variables, data sources and exact proxies used for 
power-sharing. Our sample contains information on the 26 district councils from 1973 to 
2001. For the regression analysis, we aggregate the data at the annual level (while for some 
part of the analysis we use monthly data). We are able to make use of fine grained data on 
conflict and religious composition at the district level. In particular, the data on religious 
composition is from various censuses and is provided by the Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency (NISRA). We use the 1971 census to get the number of Catholics and 
Protestants for each district. As our data excludes respondents who report no or a different 
confession we get a slight underestimate of population. We combine this data with the 
census data for 1981 and 1991. In order to get long run averages, we take the long-term 
average between the three censuses. However, we also run various robustness checks using 
the interpolated, time-varying data or just the 1971 pre-sample census data. 
 
The data on violence has been originally collected by Sutton (1994), has been updated by 
the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), and has been linked to fine-grained geo-
localisation in Mueller et al. (2017b). This data only includes killings related directly to the 
Northern Irish conflict, and no other acts of violence such as non-politically motivated 
murders. The data is very disaggregated both spatially and in time, and much more precise 
than most geo-referenced conflict events data for other countries. A very remarkable feature 
of the data is also that the detailed reports on casualties allow us to identify the religious 
group affiliation of both the perpetrators and victims of violence, as well as many other 
individual characteristics. In particular, Sutton (1994) has collected information about the 
date of death of the victims, the names of the deceased, his or her age, their ‘status’ in 
relation to the conflict, which organisation killed them, and a brief description of the 
circumstances of their death. The source information used includes newspapers, periodicals 
and books consulted, which are listed in the bibliography of Sutton (1994). 
 
Further, we make use of data on vote shares in district council elections, from the Northern 
Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). In particular, we code variables capturing 
the vote shares of catholic, protestant and non-sectarian parties. We draw on the elections of 
1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001. 
 
The political debate in Northern Ireland has stressed the importance of the bottom-up 
power-sharing initiatives by some of the 26 district councils (the main sub-national political 
units) during the last decades. The UK Freedom of Information act obliges them to answer 
queries on the exact historical power-sharing agreements at the local level. We have 
contacted all of these district councils, and they have sent us data on the exact years and 
party of the council chairman and vice chairman of each council. We use a categorisation of 
parties as Catholic, Protestant and non-sectarian to construct our main explanatory variables 
of interest in our paper. 
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In particular, the main definition of power-sharing used is as follows: we code a given 
district in a given month as implementing power-sharing if the mayor (i.e. the chairman of 
the district council) and the vice-mayor are in parties with different sectarian backgrounds 
(i.e. Catholic, Protestant, non-sectarian). The reason we rely on this proxy is that indeed the 
typical way power-sharing was implemented in Northern Ireland in the period studied was 
that after a formal or informal, implicit agreement, in a situation of power-sharing the main 
parties involved would rotate the important mayor and vice-mayor positions over the 
electoral period, with the one party holding this key position in a given year, but offering the 
vice-mayor position to their partner party, and vice versa in the coming year. In contrast, in 
a district without power-sharing the party winning elections would typically monopolize all 
key positions – even if the margin of victory was slim. It is important to notice that in many 
cases it is difficult to know ex-post up to what extent a given episode we code as power-
sharing represented a formal or informal agreement, and our data-driven algorithmic 
approach may –as all algorithmic approaches– both in a few instances wrongly code an 




In a nutshell, our method of categorising council districts in this objective, automatic 
method is a good way to side-step debates regarding whether the intent of each and every 
sharing of power was indeed the sharing of power. Put differently, while the cost of using an 
automatic algorithm (as ours) is to possibly increase statistical noise (resulting in potential 
attenuation bias), it allows to avoid the cognitive biases affecting hand coding (e.g. the 
hand-coding could be unconsciously affected by prejudices of the coder). 
 
However, we shall also consider two alternative definitions of power-sharing. We first show 
that the results are robust to a more narrow definition of power-sharing, where non-sectarian 
parties are discarded and power-sharing is defined as situations with either a Catholic mayor 
and Protestant vice-mayor or vice versa Protestant mayor and Catholic vice-mayor. 
Secondly, we will follow the explanations in Knox (1996) who argues that the DUP and 
Sinn Fein were sceptical with respect to power sharing agreements at the local level and we 
only keep configurations coded as power-sharing if they do not include these two parties. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample (monthly data)         
Variable Obs. Mean St.De. Min Max 
power sharing 7293 0.3848 0.4866 0 1 
Casualties 7293 0.2302 0.9741 0 28 
casualties killed by loyalists 7293 0.0664 0.4229 0 9 
casual. killed by republicans 7293 0.1351 0.5930 0 12 
casual. killed by state forces 7293 0.0186 0.1979 0 9 
                                                          
8
 As discussed in Knox (1996), the power-sharing agreements in Northern Ireland have implied a great deal of rotation and implicit 
support of a hung council by the other sectarian bloc. While the incentives for such explicit or implicit power-sharing agreements 
are shaped by the electoral configuration (and in particular the absence of clear-cut majority), such power-sharing often takes some 
time to be put in place, with seats being rotated, and parties having to wait until it is their turn to hold the chair / vice-chair 
positions. This explains why the use of powersharing sometimes also changes in the middle between two elections. 
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cath. in district (in 1000s) 7293 35.85 19.51 6.00 115.67 
prot. in district (in 1000s) 7293 21.61 33.46 2.72 279.69 
share of catholics 7293 0.685 0.189 0.195 0.908 
            
Panel B: Full Sample (yearly data)         
Variable Obs. Mean St.De. Min Max 
power sharing 619 0.3854 0.4859 0 1 
casualties 619 2.7124 7.6227 0 117 
casualties killed by loyalists 619 0.7819 3.2170 0 52 
casual. killed by republicans 619 1.5913 4.0828 0 52 
casual. killed by state forces 619 0.2197 0.8629 0 9 
cath. in district (in 1000s) 619 35.85 19.48 6.14 115.67 
prot. in district (in 1000s) 619 21.57 33.50 2.72 275.77 
share of catholics 619 0.685 0.189 0.199 0.908 
      Panel C: Council Districts with a 15 percent Bandwidth around Protestant Majority 
Variable Obs. Mean St.De. Min Max 
power sharing 267 0.5558 0.4969 0 1 
casualties 267 2.4045 3.9127 0 28 
casualties killed by loyalists 267 0.4532 1.3210 0 10 
casual. killed by republicans 267 1.5618 2.5559 0 15 
casual. killed by state forces 267 0.2247 0.8146 0 9 
cath. in district (in 1000s) 267 34.05 10.53 10.91 52.24 
prot. in district (in 1000s) 267 8.12 6.14 2.72 30.65 
share of catholics 267 0.818 0.070 0.555 0.908 
Notes: Variable definitions and sources in the main text. Panel C excludes Belfast. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the key variables used in the analysis, at the district 
level, temporally aggregated at the month (Panel A), resp. annual level (Panel B). In Panel C 
we present the values of the key variables for the sample of observations around the 50% 
vote threshold used later in the 2SLS analysis. 
 
In particular, as shown in the Panels A and B, about 39 percent of all district-months/years 
experienced power sharing. Over the sample period, there were on average about 2.7 
casualties per district and year. Overall this implies almost 1700 deaths in our sample 1973-
2001. In panel C we report summary statistics for a restricted sub-sample of Panel B, which 
we will explain further below. We run most of our analysis on this sample to ensure better 
identification of the effect of power sharing. The most striking difference between the two 
samples of Panel B and Panel C is the number of Protestants which falls dramatically. The 
reason is that we focus on council districts that were politically balanced, i.e. where Catholic 
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and Protestant sectarian parties reached a similar seat share in council elections. This 
typically happened in areas with Catholics accounting for substantially more than half of the 
population, the reason being that parts of the Catholic electorate and politicians boycotted 
the participation to elections organised by a state they considered to be illegitimate.
9
 As is 
obvious from Panel C, this also means that power-sharing is much more likely in this 
sample: Roughly 55 percent of all district-years experienced power sharing in the restricted 
sample. 
 
While Figure 1 in the introduction only depicted violence trends and related this to national 
politics, we now want to move beyond this simple qualitative nationwide narrative and 
study the dynamics at the local level. Thus, Figure 2 below displays the correlation between 
local power-sharing (as defined in more detail above) and violence. As noted before, there 
are two clear patterns: First, casualties decline over time. There are two major declines in 
violence. The first at the end of the 1970s and the second in the mid-1990s. Second, the 
number of council districts which shared power increased. By the end of our sample period 
more than half of the 26 council districts were sharing power. 
 
It is also noteworthy that power-sharing correlates with lower violence on the time-
dimension. Especially the later decrease was accompanied by an increase in the number of 
districts which shared power. Our identification strategy will, however, not exploit these 
aggregate trends in violence and power-sharing and instead ask whether the violence 
declined in districts that adopted power sharing after doing so compared to other districts. 
Here it is important to note that all districts experienced at least one year of power-sharing 
as defined above. 
 
 
                                                          
9 For example, the data presented in McAllister (2004) shows that in the late 1960s, during the 1970s and during much of the 
1980s the abstenionism of the Catholics was roughly twice as large as the abstentionism of the Protestants. 
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Figure 2.  The correlation between fatalities and the extent of local power-sharing 
 
5. MAIN ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Before plunging in the regression analysis, it is important to mention the main empirical 
challenge: Power-sharing institutions are endogenously selected, which means in plain 
language that it is not random if a district adopts power-sharing – and districts doing so may 
be fundamentally different and hence hard to compare to others without power-sharing. This 
is both a theoretical and an empirical problem. Empirically, places that adopt power-sharing 
may have other characteristics affecting violence directly. For example, if places with 
power-sharing were to have more cooperative social norms, then a correlation between less 
violence and more power-sharing could be spurious, reflecting simply the fact that both 
variables are correlated to cooperative social norms, i.e. leading to an omitted variable bias. 
If such confounding factors were at play then a potential correlation between power-sharing 
and peace would not reveal any causal impact of power-sharing. Put differently, an increase 
in power-sharing would not result in a reduction in violence, and mistaking correlation for 
causation could lead to erroneous policy recommendations.  
 
In the regression analysis, we will address the challenges to causal identification by putting 
in place a series of statistical strategies, which shall be described in detail below. First, we 
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5.1. OLS Fixed Effects Results 
As a first step into analysing the effect of power sharing we will exploit the time-variation in 
power sharing and assess how this correlates with changes in violence at the ward level. In 
Table 2 we run Ordinary-least squares (OLS) regressions, with the unit of observation being 
the district-year, and as dependent variable the number of conflict-related fatalities per 1000 
inhabitants in a given administrative district-year. Our main explanatory variable is the 
power-sharing measure as defined above, i.e. a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when 
power-sharing is present in a given district-year, and zero otherwise. In particular, we run 
the following specification: 
 
𝐹𝑑𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑑𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒅 + 𝜹𝒀𝒕 + 𝜽𝒁𝒅𝒕 + 𝜖𝑑𝑡                                                                                   (1) 
 
Where d=district, t=year, 𝐹𝑑𝑡=fatalities per population, 𝑆𝑑𝑡=power-sharing dummy, 
𝑿𝒅=vector of district fixed effects, 𝒀𝒕=vector of time dummies, 𝒁𝒅𝒕=vector of further 
control variables, 𝜖𝑑𝑡=error term. 
 
In column (1) of this table we display the plain raw correlation between power-sharing and 
fatalities per capita. As expected, we find a negative coefficient that is however not 
statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient in absolute terms is likely to suffer 
from downward bias, as power-sharing requires some minimum presence of both religious 
groups, which is also a factor increasing the risk of sectarian violence (put differently, in a 
religiously homogenous ward the scope for power-sharing and for violence drop alike). 
 
To put in place a first step of refinement of the statistical analysis, a measure to address 
statistical biases is that from column (2) on all regressions exploit changes in power sharing 
over time due to the use of 26 district fixed effects, which control for all time-invariant 
factors in a given local area, e.g. historical industrial or demographic structure. We find in 
column (2) a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the power-sharing variable. 
In other words, as power sharing is adopted in a council, this council become significantly 
less violent. 
 
From column (3) onwards we in addition include 28 year fixed effects, filtering out all 
global shocks hitting in a given year all of Northern Ireland, e.g. national elections. In a 
nutshell, all hidden factors that vary at the district level and are constant over time, as well 
as all global shocks hitting the whole of Northern Ireland are filtered out and cannot bias our 
estimates. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of these controls for aggregate shocks. 
Further, in column (4) we include two important control variables related to the political 
orientation of a given ward: The share of seats won by Catholic, resp. Protestant parties in 
the last district council election. We will show in the following section that these seat shares 
were important factors leading to the adoption of power-sharing. Still, the results when 
controlling for these factors are still very similar and the coefficient of power-sharing 
remains negative and statistically significant. 




In columns (5) and (6) we exploit as robustness check the fact that we have monthly data. In 
these regressions, we include year/month fixed effects, i.e. we control for monthly changes 
in violence. We can easily see that also at the district-month level the results are very 
similar; the size of the coefficients is about a 12th of the coefficients in columns (3) and (4). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
  
      power sharing -0.00967 -0.0292*** -0.0199*** -0.0207*** -0.0017*** -0.0018*** 
 
(0.00595) (0.00925) (0.00653) (0.00658) (0.000548) (0.000551) 
seat share of catholic 
parties 








seat share of 
protestant parties 








          
  district fixed effects no yes yes yes yes yes 
year fixed effects no no yes yes no no 
month/year fixed 
effects no no no no yes yes 
observations 619 619 619 619 7,293 7,293 
R-squared 0.004 0.034 0.212 0.217 0.076 0.077 
number of districts 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Casualties per capita are 
casualties per 1000 population. Years in columns (1) to (4) are matched to the electoral cycle which begins in 
May and ends in April the following year. Columns (5) and (6) use monthly data. 
Table 2: OLS regressions with Fixed Effects 
 
If interpreted as a causal effect, the coefficients in columns (3) to (6) would imply that the 
adoption of a power sharing agreement at the district level reduced violence by 0.02 deaths 
per 1000 population and year. 
 
However, controlling for district and time fixed effects is not enough to fully rule out 
omitted variable bias. For example, what could still be a concern with the regressions run in 
Table 2 is the worry that there may be shocks or trends at the local level driving both the 
adoption of power-sharing and increasing peace. Take, for example, a local economic 
slowdown affecting at the same time election results and opportunity costs of engaging in 
violence.  
 
One first way to rule out that local political trends drive our results is to look at the variation 
in violence before and after the election month bringing changes in power sharing. Figure 3 
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below displays in one figure both the effect of a start and an end of power-sharing, 
controlling for district fixed effects and time fixed effects. Left of the 0 are ordered 
observations before the start of power-sharing or after its end, while to the right of the 0 are 
depicted observations taking place after power-sharing has started or before power-sharing 
has ended (e.g. a number of, say, 5 on the horizontal scale displays casualty averages for 
observations that are 5 months after the beginning of power-sharing or 5 months before its 
end). The black solid line represents the average casualties per head compared to the 
average and the two dashed line correspond to the 95% confidence intervals. The straight 
red lines show the average levels to the left and right of 0.  
 
Figure 3. Fatalities in the 12 months around changes to power sharing 
 
The figure shows that indeed violence tends to be lower in the months following the 
beginning of a power-sharing agreement as compared to the months before, and also tends 
to be reduced before the end of power-sharing as opposed to after the power-sharing ended. 
Crucially, there is no discernible pre-trend in violence or a clear post-trend. Instead, 
violence, albeit volatile, seems to take on a new average after power sharing is adopted but 
does not fall before. This allows us to address concerns that long term trends may be 
 
Note: The black solid line corresponds to the coefficients and the dashed lines to the 95  percent 
confidence interval. The horizontal red lines depict the averages to the left and right of zero. The negative 
numbers on the left of 0 on the x-axis correspond to the months before the start of the power-sharing or the 
months after the end of power-sharing. For example, the coefficient of “-2” is the average of casualties in all 
instances 2 months before the power-sharing start or 2 months after the power-sharing end. Analogously, 
the positive numbers to the right of 0 correspond to the months after the beginning of power-sharing or the 

































months relative to change in power sharing (at 0)
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responsible for both the adoption of power sharing and the fall in violence. Similarly, we 
find that once power-sharing is removed, the peace-building effects are not persistent but 
that violence surges again. Again, there is no discernible trend in violence before the end of 
power sharing. This also suggests that it is unlikely that violence was systematically used to 
bring down local power sharing.
10
 
5.2. Instrument Results 
To take a further refinement step in our identification strategy we will now instrument the 
existence of power-sharing in a given year and district with whether any sectarian block, 
Catholic or Protestant, has managed to win the absolute majority. We expect power-sharing 
to be more likely when none of the two blocks has an absolute majority. 
 
Districts with clear-cut majorities for one party may differ in various dimensions from 
districts lacking such an absolute majority. In order to avoid “comparing apples with pears”, 
we shall restrict the analysis to districts where the protestant parties had, on average, a vote 
share in the vicinity of 50%, making it quasi-random whether a given election allows them 
to gain a majority. In the same vein, we also focus on council districts where the number of 
independents is relatively small to avoid comparing a ward with, say, 40% Protestants and 
60% non-sectarian seats with, say, a ward with 40% Protestant and 60% Catholic seats, 
which would arguably be a very different place. 
 
Take a numerical example to illustrate this: Say Catholic parties have on average around 50 
percent of the seats, independents 15 percent and Protestants 35 percent. Small, random 
variations could then decide on whether on a given election day the Catholic parties barely 
reach or miss an absolute majority allowing them to govern alone. If they barely miss the 
absolute majority, their incentives are much increased to engage in power-sharing (rather 
than to have to deal with a hung parliament). In terms of identifying variation, changes in 
the electoral composition of the district council are likely to be driven by either changes in 
turnout or by switches between sectarian and non-sectarian parties (as shown by McAllister, 
2004, switches of voters from one sectarian block to another are quite rare).  
 
In line with this example we will define a bandwidth of x% as the x percent deviation from 
the threshold of 50 percent for Protestant sectarian parties, 50 percent for Catholic sectarian 
parties and 0 percent for non-sectarian parties. A bandwidth of 10%, for example, puts all 
cases in our sample in which Protestant sectarian parties had between 40 and 60 percent of 
the seats while non-sectarian parties had less than 10 percent of the seats. Given the limited 
number of very religiously mixed districts and the relatively small number of elections, too 
                                                          
10 These results are also confirmed when running a regression including current power-sharing and past power-sharing at the 
same time as explanatory variables. While current power-sharing significantly reduces casualties, the coefficient of past power-
sharing is not statistically significant. Further, this pattern —of power-sharing start reducing violence but power-sharing end 
driving it up again—is also confirmed when constructing two separate figures, one for power-sharing start and one for its end 
(results available upon request). 
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small a bandwidth would make us lose too much data and restrict the sample too much. It 
would also increase the risk that the results are driven by a small number of observations. At 
the same time, a too large bandwidth would increase the risk of biases from unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the face of this trade-off, we adopt three different bandwidths, displaying 
the results for these small (10%), intermediate (15%) and large (20%) bandwidth. It should 
be stressed that we used the average seat share to define the bandwidth and hence which 
district councils appear in the data. This ensures that we can look at changes in violence 
over time in the same council districts when political fortunes swing one or the other way. 
However, we also run robustness checks using contemporaneous seats instead. 
 
Table 3 displays the result from 2SLS regressions with as second stage a modified version 
of equation (1) described above, where power-sharing 𝑆𝑑𝑡 is instrumented with a dummy 
taking a value of 1 when there is no majority, 𝑅𝑑𝑡. 
 
In column (1) we start with the relatively large bandwidth of 20 percentage points (i.e. 
including in the sample wards where the mean vote share of Protestant parties lies between 
30 and 70 percent, and where the average vote share of non-sectarian parties is below 20 
percent). As mentioned above, we instrument for the power-sharing dummy using as 
instrument a dummy taking a value of 1 when no sectarian block has reached the absolute 
majority, and zero otherwise. As shown in Table A1 in Appendix B, the predictive power of 
no majority on power-sharing is very large: The coefficient of no majority in the first stage 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. It indicates that without a majority, the likelihood 
of a power sharing arrangement goes up by over 30 percent. The F-stat of the first stage is 
well above the conventional threshold of 10 (with the exception of column 6). This relaxes 
concerns about a weak instrument problem.  
 
 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.146*** -0.144*** -0.106** -0.178*** -0.175** -0.135* 
 
(0.0462) (0.0516) (0.0454) (0.0619) (0.0763) (0.0703) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 
   
0.0859 0.139 0.459** 
    
(0.160) (0.168) (0.211) 
seat share of 
protestant 
parties 
   
-0.281 -0.229 0.0265 
    
(0.188) (0.209) (0.236) 
       district fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.175 0.155 0.244 0.070 0.050 0.203 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. "Bandwidth 
of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share for 
non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
Table 3.  Baseline results with 2SLS regressions 
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Column (1) of Table 3 displays the coefficient in the second stage of the instrumented 
power-sharing variable. It has the expected negative sign, and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The fact that the 2SLS coefficients are larger than the OLS coefficients is by 
no means surprising: While power-sharing arguably has a conflict reducing effect, it is more 
often adopted in places at risk -- with a large violence potential and unclear political 




In column (2) the bandwidth is reduced to 15 percent (i.e. to districts with a Protestant seat 
share within 15 percentage points of the 50 percent threshold, and with non-sectarian parties 
having less than 15% of the seats), while in column (3) the bandwidth is further reduced to 
the mean Protestant vote share being less than 10 percentage points away from 50% and 
independents having on average less than 10% of the seats. Even with this tighter sample 
restriction the results are very similar, with the coefficient of interest in the second stage 
being negative and significant.
12
 Columns (4)-(6) replicate the first three columns, but 
controlling in addition for the share of seats of Catholics and Protestants. The results are 
very similar. Reassuringly, not only the coefficient of interest is statistically significant in all 
columns, but also the magnitude of this coefficient is of similar size throughout. These three 
columns (4)-(6) are our preferred specifications.  
 
The effects are quantitatively sizeable. The coefficient in, say, column (2) in Table 3 
amounts to –0.144, while the mean number of fatalities per 1000 population and year in the 
sample underlying this regression is about 0.05 (and the standard deviation is 0.09). This 
means that when comparing in this subsample a situation of no power sharing with power 
sharing, fatalities per capita would be increased in the absence of power-sharing by roughly 
three times the baseline risk. Another way to understand the size of the effect is to calculate 
how many lives have been saved in the restricted sample from power sharing in the 55% of 
district-years where it was in place (compared to having no power-sharing at all). From 




Note that given the inclusion of district council fixed effects, our coefficients reflect within-
district changes in relatively violent districts, while in some districts the baseline risk of 
violence is very low. So it is the intensive and not the extensive margin driving our large 
coefficients. The standard deviation of our dependent variable is substantially larger than the 
mean. This implies that reductions in violence over time can lead to large coefficients.  
 
                                                          
11 Some part of the different magnitude of the OLS versus 2SLS coefficients can also be explained by the fact that the 2SLS 
sample contains only politically contested districts, for which the effect may be larger. When running the OLS regression of 
Table 2, column 4 on the sample of Table 3, column 5 (with 267 observations) we obtain a coefficient of -0.039 (significant at 
the 1 percent level). 
12 Reducing even further the bandwidth would be difficult, as with for example a bandwidth of +/- 5% around the threshold we 
would only be left with 72 observations from only 3 districts – which would be a very small sample, especially in our setting 
with district fixed effects and annual time dummies. If we still run this regression we continue to find a negative coefficient, 
yet not statistically significant. 
13 The number of district years is 267*0.55, the average population in the sample is 34+8 thousand, power-sharing is estimated 
to save in a district-year 0.144 lives per 1000 inhabitants, so that the estimated lives saved corresponds to 
267*0.55*(34+8)*(0.144) = 888. 
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6. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In this section –which may be skipped by non-technical or time-pressed readers– we shall 
summarise the main robustness checks. All tables mentioned are in the Appendix.  
 
First, we shall show the results for the OLS reduced form relation between the instrument, 
“No majority”, and casualties per capita. This is displayed in Table A2. “No majority” has 
the expected negative sign and is statistically significant in 5 out of 6 columns. 
 
The second robustness check is to replicate our baseline Table 3 but using the time-varying 
interpolated population data instead of long-term averages. This checks whether long-term 
population changes might drive our results. We find that this is not the case. In fact, the 
estimated coefficients in Table A3 are almost identical to the ones found in Table 3. The 
reason is that we are exploiting year-on-year variation and the effects we find are therefore 
driven by quite sharp changes in violence as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Similarly, in Table A4 we replicate Table 3 but compute the dependent variable, casualties 
per capita, using time-invariant population data from the 1971 census. This has the virtue of 
using population values that reflect best pre-conflict demographics. Further, it is useful to 
point out that in the raw data the population numbers for the 1971 census are also somewhat 
more balanced than for the following censuses. The results reported in A4 are very similar 
to the baseline estimates of Table 3, both in terms of coefficient magnitude and statistical 
significance.  
 
Our coding of power-sharing is based purely on the names of council chairmen (mayor) and 
vice-chairmen, which has the advantage of avoiding making subjective judgments which 
could bias the results. While our strict following of an automatic coding rule allows us to 
avoid a series of cognitive biases associated to hand-coding, it has the downside of maybe 
missing out on some subtleties regarding power-sharing agreements. In particular, in his 
account on power-sharing in Northern Ireland, Knox (1996) has pointed out that the DUP 
and Sinn Fein parties took a traditionally sceptical stand to power-sharing. Hence, in Table 
A5 we only keep configurations coded as power-sharing if they do not include these two 
parties. The point estimates increase slightly. This is consistent with the claims in Knox 
(1996). 
 
Table A6 focuses on two further robustness checks. First of all, in columns (1)-(3) it 
replicates columns (4)-(6) of baseline Table 3, but applying this time a more restrictive 
definition of power-sharing where non-sectarian parties are discarded and where power-
sharing only refers to situations with either a Catholic mayor and Protestant vice-mayor or a 
Protestant mayor and Catholic vice-mayor. Then, in columns (4)-(6) it replicates the 
columns (4)-(6) of baseline Table 3, but using the current instead of the average seat share 
for constructing the bandwidth of wards included in the sample. The results are very similar 
and the variable of interest carries on being statistically significant in all columns. Note also 
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that the magnitude of the coefficient (in absolute terms) becomes slightly larger with the 
more restrictive definition of power-sharing, which is very intuitive, as this focuses on 
cooperation between Catholics and Protestants even in the absence of non-sectarian parties. 
A caveat is that in some columns of Table A6 the F-stats are very low, and hence the results 
of this robustness table need to be interpreted with caution due to a weak instrument 
problem. 
 
Another alternative definition of bandwidths is implemented for Table A7. In columns (1)-
(3) the running variable used to construct the bandwidth is the share of catholic votes 
instead of the share of protestant votes. While this is conceptually similar, this alternative 
construction of bandwidth leads to a lower sample size, as there are fewer districts fulfilling 
the criteria of inclusion. The results obtained however are very similar. In columns (4)-(6) 
we go back to our construction of the running variable for the bandwidth being the 
protestant vote share but we replace the condition on non-sectarian parties being small by an 
alternative constraint of the catholic parties vote share being below 50%. The results are 
again very similar. 
 
Further, Table A8 implements another two robustness checks. In columns (1)-(3) we 
replicate columns (4)-(6) of baseline Table 3, but restricting the sample to before 1995, as 
arguably after this date nationwide power-sharing initiatives started to kick in and the 
general level of violence plummeted. Coefficients are estimated somewhat less precisely 
with less data but they remain statistically significant and the sign and magnitude from 
Table 3 continue to hold. Note that this implies that we are not confounding aggregate 
changes with local power sharing. Further, in columns (4)-(6) of Table A8 we replicate 
again columns (4)-(6) of baseline Table 3, but this time adding the square term of our 
control variables. The results are again robust. 
 
In Table A9 we focus on the pre-post election changes. In the columns (1)-(3) we replicate 
the columns (4)-(6) of Table 3, but include in the sample only the years right before and 
after elections. This leads to a drop of roughly half of the sample. In columns (4)-(6) we also 
focus on the pre- and post-election period, but collapse the data into two year periods. This 
again leads to a large drop in the sample size. While in Table A9 the coefficients are of 
comparable magnitude as in Table 3 the standard errors are much larger, and statistical 
significance is lost in some of the specifications. The regressions of Table A9 have to be 
interpreted with caution, as the drop in observations goes along with a serious weak 
instrument problem in the first stage (with the F-stat falling in some specifications as low as 
3). 
 
Finally, we present further tables with additional control variables. To start with, in Table 
A10 we show that the results of the baseline Table 3 are robust to controlling for lagged 
casualties. In Table A11 we focus on demographic variables, showing that our results 
continue to hold when controlling for the population size of Catholics or for religious 





 In Table A12 we control for the number of the so called “Orange walks” in a 
given district and year,
15
 as well as for whether there has been a change in the chairman or 
vice-chairman in a given district and year (to rule out that it is simply any change and not 
the start of power-sharing in particular that has pacifying effects). Our results are robust to 
all these controls. 
 
Last but not least, we have generated a variable that lies between 0 and 1 and captures the 
share of months in a year in which casualties occur in a given district council. This 
attenuates concerns about few very violent events driving the results. These results are 




Given that we want to study changes in power-sharing around the 50 percent vote threshold 
for Protestant parties, we are naturally limited by the number of observations when slicing 
the data further.  
 
At first, we shall check whether the identified effect holds across the board for all types of 
fatalities or whether it is restricted to only a particular type of violence, say, group A 
attacking group B. For this purpose, we replicate our baseline Table 3, but with as 
dependent variable only the fatalities killed by loyalist paramilitaries (Table A14), the 
fatalities killed by republican paramilitaries (Table A15), as well as the fatalities killed by 
state forces (Table A16). All three tables are contained in the Appendix. 
 
We find that power-sharing reduced the killings committed by any of the protagonists of the 
Northern Irish “Troubles”. While we find strong and statistically significant effects for both 
loyalist and republican paramilitaries, the effects of power-sharing on killings by state forces 
are somewhat less large and less precisely estimated. This is despite the fact that state forces 
were responsible for about the same number of casualties as loyalist paramilitaries in our 
sample. This is in line with the idea that changes in local political representation were 
driving down local sectarian violence within the respective communities whereas higher-
level violence between state forces and the IRA would still continue. 
 
In Table 4 we investigate whether there is any evidence that the effect of power-sharing is 
larger or not for places with a higher share of Catholics. In the first two columns, we run the 
OLS regressions of Table 2, but interact our power-sharing variable of interest with the 
share of Catholics in the population. We find a negative and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term between power-sharing and the share of Catholics in the district. Power-
                                                          
14 Polarization at the district level is computed by the authors using population sizes from NISRA (as described in Section 4.2) 
and applying the formula of Reynal-Querol (2002).  
15 We have newly collected this data, from personal communication with the “Grand Orange Lodge”. 
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sharing has a larger conflict-reducing effect where Catholics have a bigger majority in the 
population. In columns (3)-(6) we focus on our baseline IV specifications of Table 3. Given 
the complications of instrumenting an interaction term, we choose an alternative way of 
assessing heterogeneous effects, namely to split the sample between below-median and 
above-median share of Catholics at the council district level. While the picture emerging 
from columns (3)-(4) still suggests that the effects are larger with a larger Catholic share in 




                                                          
16 We have also investigated whether the impact of power sharing is larger in a configuration of “Catholic mayor, Protestant 
vice-mayor” versus “Protestant mayor, Catholic vice-mayor” but have not found statistically significant differences (results 
available upon request). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS IV 
  








VARIABLES casualties per capita 
power sharing 0.0296 0.0278 -0.117** -0.182*** -0.203* -0.198** 
 
(0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0540) (0.0622) (0.111) (0.0841) 
power sharing * share of 
catholics in council 
district -0.0724* -0.0711* 
    
 
(0.0391) (0.0392) 




















district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 619 619 145 141 145 141 
R-squared 0.219 0.224 0.219 0.204 -0.16 0.160 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. The samples are split in 
columns (3) to (6). Council districts with many catholics are council districts with more than 82 percent of Catholics (median). We use a bandwidth of 20 
percent in columns (3) to (6). This is defined by an average seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average 
share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2.  
Table 4.  Heterogeneous effects with respect to Catholic share 
 





There are compelling conceptual reasons for why to expect power-sharing to reduce the 
scope of violence. When each group in society (including minority groups) have a 
guaranteed access to political power, their incentives are larger to bet on politics rather than 
weaponry to defend their interests. This is due to the fact that additional rents that can be 
grabbed when gaining power by force are smaller when the peaceful sharing rule is more 
favourable for opposition groups.  
 
Unfortunately, measuring empirically the causal impact of power sharing on conflict is hard, 
as power sharing is favoured by similar factors as is peace (e.g. cooperative social norms 
and trust make both power-sharing and peace more likely). Thus, basing policy 
recommendations on simple correlations can result in misleading conclusions.  
 
Northern Ireland constitutes an ideal setting to study the impact of power-sharing, as it is 
one of the rare conflicts taking place in a developed country with excellent data quality and 
where there has been large-scaled variation in the use of power-sharing. To surmount the 
econometric challenges mentioned above we thus focus on Northern Ireland, making use of 
within-district variation. Concretely, we have put in place an empirical strategy based on a 
series of fixed effects, instrumental variables and restricting the sample to observations close 
to the majority threshold. This empirical analysis leads to the conclusion that the presence of 
power-sharing has indeed a strong and robust violence-reducing effect, and on both types of 
paramilitary groups (republican and loyalist) involved in the fighting.  
 
While this is already a first step towards causal identification, it is important to recognize 
the limits of the analysis. First of all, the number of observations close to the 50% votes 
threshold is not very large and given that the effect of missing out on a majority on power-
sharing is fuzzy (rather than sharp), there is not enough mass of observations for running a 
classical regression-discontinuity design. A second caveat is that while our analysis is telling 
for situations where both groups are close to reaching a majority, which in the Northern 
Ireland context means to have a sizeable Catholic share, the findings on the impact of 
power-sharing cannot be extrapolated to other situations where one groups is 
demographically and politically dominant, limiting hence the external validity of our results. 
In the same vein, it is important to bear in mind that Northern Ireland is a relatively rich 
country without many natural resources and that one should be cautious when wanting to 
extrapolate the current findings to developing countries with more other risk factors for 
conflict such as poverty and natural resource wealth. Future research on the impact of 
power-sharing in various configurations is hence strongly encouraged. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES power sharing agreement 
              
no sectarian party has a 
majority 0.394*** 0.371*** 0.396*** 0.370*** 0.350** 0.341*** 
 
(0.0619) (0.0635) (0.0884) (0.0899) (0.113) (0.0919) 
catholic parties seat share 
   
0.152 0.375 -0.577 
    
(1.222) (1.372) (2.189) 
protestant parties seat share 
   
-0.535 -0.421 -1.075 
    
(1.282) (1.375) (1.654) 
              
district fixed effects Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.294 0.281 0.368 0.299 0.288 0.374 
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 23.46 15.79 11.1 17.8 10.58 6.88 
Number of wards 12 11 7 12 11 7 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.           
Table A1.  First stage of Baseline Table 2 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
no sectarian party has a 
majority -0.0576*** -0.0533*** -0.0420* -0.0657*** -0.0613** -0.0461 
 
(0.0133) (0.0163) (0.0180) (0.0166) (0.0202) (0.0240) 
seat share of catholic parties 
   
0.0589 0.0737 0.537* 
    
(0.243) (0.283) (0.234) 
seat share of protestant parties 
   
-0.186 -0.155 0.172 
    
(0.186) (0.218) (0.214) 
              
district fixed effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.258 0.226 0.271 0.276 0.242 0.339 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for protestant 
parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
 
Table A2. Reduced form estimates 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.147*** -0.151*** -0.113** -0.175*** -0.181** -0.142* 
 
(0.0456) (0.0527) (0.0470) (0.0607) (0.0774) (0.0727) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 
   
0.117 0.163 0.478** 
    
(0.157) (0.170) (0.217) 
seat share of 
protestant 
parties 
   
-0.250 -0.219 0.0364 
    
(0.185) (0.213) (0.244) 
              
district fixed 
effects Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects Yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.196 0.159 0.245 0.107 0.061 0.204 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. 
"Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) 
and an average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously. Population is interpolated between 
census years 1971, 1981 and 1991. 
Table A3. Using interpolated time-varying population numbers 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.140*** -0.151*** -0.110** -0.167*** -0.185** -0.141* 
 
(0.0467) (0.0542) (0.0477) (0.0619) (0.0803) (0.0736) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 
   
0.115 0.139 0.474** 
    
(0.159) (0.178) (0.223) 
seat share of 
protestant 
parties 
   
-0.248 -0.246 0.0238 
    
(0.185) (0.220) (0.249) 
       district fixed 
effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.194 0.153 0.229 0.117 0.045 0.189 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. "Bandwidth 
of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average 
share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously. Per capita measure is calculated using population from the 
1971 census. 
 
Table A4. Using time-invariant population numbers from the 1971 census 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.151*** -0.140*** -0.123** -0.178*** -0.161*** -0.135** 
 
(0.0449) (0.0438) (0.0518) (0.0583) (0.0590) (0.0646) 
seat share of catholic 
parties 
   
-0.0760 0.0171 0.324 
    
(0.174) (0.170) (0.235) 
seat share of 
protestant parties 
   
-0.237 -0.150 0.0756 
    
(0.168) (0.161) (0.208) 
       district fixed effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes Yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.229 0.252 0.225 0.129 0.184 0.204 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. "Bandwidth of 
20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share for non-
sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
 
Table A5. Alternative definition of power-sharing (excluding DUP and Sinn Fein) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROBUSTNESS Alternative definition power-sharing Alternative definition bandwidth 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.260** -0.212** -0.165* -0.164** -0.145** -0.191 
 
(0.128) (0.106) (0.0963) (0.0637) (0.0698) (0.189) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 0.457** 0.506** 0.759*** 0.0939 0.462* -0.000105 
 
(0.227) (0.206) (0.210) (0.182) (0.262) (0.695) 
seat share of 
prot. Parties 0.166 0.221 0.337* -0.362 -0.00465 -0.578 
 
(0.230) (0.201) (0.199) (0.260) (0.387) (1.169) 
dist. fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 300 236 162 
R-squared -0.561 -0.228 0.037 0.077 0.260 -0.527 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (1)-(3) the "bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by the average 
seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and a share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. In columns (4)-(6) the 
"bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by the contemporaneous seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an 
average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously. Columns (1)-(3) use only sectarian party shares to define 
power sharing.  
Table A6. Alternative definitions of power-sharing (only sectarian parties) and bandwidth 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROBUSTNESS Alternative definition bandwidth (catholic running variable) Alternative definition bandwidth (catholic parties less than 50%) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.153** -0.173** -0.171* -0.115** -0.122*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.0608) (0.0785) (0.0919) (0.0503) (0.0472) (0.0392) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 0.152 0.103 0.0949 0.108 0.289* 0.286 
 
(0.166) (0.205) (0.213) (0.123) (0.155) (0.190) 
seat share of 
protestant 
parties -0.105 -0.239 -0.250 -0.0847 0.0111 -0.140 
 
(0.140) (0.237) (0.244) (0.116) (0.150) (0.192) 
       district fix. effects yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 261 240 196 250 232 139 
R-squared 0.150 0.088 -0.042 0.373 0.372 0.461 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (1)-(3) the "bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by the average 
seat share for catholic parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and a share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. In columns (4)-(6) the 
"bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by the average seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and a share for catholic 
parties below 0.5. Other bandwidths are defined analogously. 
Table A7. Alternative definitions bandwidth 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROBUSTNESS Restricted to pre-1995 Additional controls 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
power sharing -0.202* -0.158* -0.185* -0.181** -0.183** -0.122** 
 
(0.114) (0.0865) (0.107) (0.0749) (0.0887) (0.0596) 
seat share of catholic parties 0.273* 0.345** 0.616*** 0.319 0.785* -0.262 
 
(0.152) (0.137) (0.234) (0.352) (0.410) (1.243) 
seat share of protestant parties -0.193 -0.0854 0.127 -0.947 -1.405** -0.0630 
 
(0.193) (0.148) (0.218) (0.672) (0.712) (0.988) 
(seat share of cath.)^2 
   
-0.279 -0.739 0.865 
    
(0.490) (0.548) (1.268) 
(seat share of prot.)^2 
   
0.586 1.062* 0.0667 
    
(0.546) (0.585) (1.026) 
district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 213 199 129 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.091 0.256 0.056 0.054 0.018 0.272 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In columns (1) to (3) we restrict the sample to the years before 1995. 
The "bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by a vote share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and a share for non-
sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
Table A8. Restriction to pre-1995 and additional controls 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.0895** -0.0901 -0.0688 -0.215** -0.239 -0.195 
 
(0.0443) (0.0641) (0.0639) (0.0849) (0.154) (0.158) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 0.153 0.189 0.403** 0.399* 0.346 0.762** 
 
(0.129) (0.155) (0.184) (0.224) (0.286) (0.326) 
seat share of 
protestant 
parties -0.179 -0.152 0.0527 -0.296 -0.379 0.0177 
 
(0.176) (0.242) (0.242) (0.263) (0.429) (0.416) 
       district fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 149 141 92 156 145 94 
R-squared 0.411 0.380 0.359 0.421 0.244 0.289 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. Columns 
(1)-(3) use only the years before and after local elections (election years are 1973, 1977,..., 2001). Columns (4)-(6) uses the sums in two years 
before  and after elections. "Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 
0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
Table A9. Restricting to the pre- and post-election period 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
              
power sharing -0.144*** -0.149** -0.0995* -0.202** -0.219** -0.167 
 
(0.0545) (0.0621) (0.0518) (0.0842) (0.111) (0.102) 
lagged casualties 
per capita 0.00853 -0.0173 0.0742 -0.0662 -0.0987 -0.0690 
 
(0.0713) (0.0739) (0.0935) (0.0914) (0.107) (0.130) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 
   
0.0163 0.0701 0.319 
    
(0.180) (0.198) (0.264) 
seat share of 
protestant 
parties 
   
-0.378 -0.354 -0.139 
    
(0.230) (0.273) (0.323) 
       district fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 277 259 168 277 259 168 
R-squared 0.164 0.122 0.263 -0.08 -0.201 0.039 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. "Bandwidth 
of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average 
share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
Table A10. Controlling for lagged violence  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
power sharing -0.167*** -0.175** -0.135* -0.158** -0.177** -0.134* 
 
(0.0554) (0.0756) (0.0713) (0.0671) (0.0811) (0.0802) 
pop. share of cath. -0.347 -0.138 1.859 
   
 
(0.358) (0.547) (1.771) 
   polarization 
   
-0.194 0.0732 0.0424 
    
(0.137) (0.273) (0.468) 
seat sh. of cath. par. 0.111 0.136 0.536*** 0.165 0.125 0.454** 
 
(0.149) (0.173) (0.193) (0.178) (0.199) (0.203) 
seat sh. of prot. par. -0.252 -0.233 0.0817 -0.180 -0.245 0.0241 
 
(0.173) (0.217) (0.214) (0.213) (0.246) (0.227) 
district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.120 0.051 0.214 0.165 0.043 0.210 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. "Bandwidth of 
20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share 
for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously. Population shares and polarization are calculated with interpolated 
population data using census data from 1971, 1981 and 1991. 
Table A11. Robustness to additional demographic controls 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita 
power sharing -0.179*** -0.179** -0.139* -0.192*** -0.202** -0.164** 
 
(0.0620) (0.0769) (0.0717) (0.0675) (0.0912) (0.0819) 
nr. orange walks 0.00565 0.00570 0.00595 
   
 
(0.00363) (0.00379) (0.00597) 
   change mayor / vice-mayor 
   
0.0263* 0.0263 0.0246 
    
(0.0155) (0.0181) (0.0164) 
seat share of catholic 
parties 0.0773 0.127 0.433** 0.0749 0.108 0.438* 
 
(0.160) (0.169) (0.217) (0.168) (0.187) (0.233) 
seat share of prot. parties -0.286 -0.239 0.00459 -0.287 -0.265 -0.0103 
 
(0.189) (0.211) (0.244) (0.196) (0.232) (0.260) 
district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.069 0.038 0.195 0.012 -0.075 0.082 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties per 1000 population. "Bandwidth of 20 
percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share for non-
sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously. Orange marches are the number of recorded marches by orange orders in the 
district and year. Changes in mayor or vice mayor are the total number of changes in the party affiliation of the mayor or vice mayor compared to previous 
year. 
Table A12. Robustness to additional political controls 
  
CAN POWER-SHARING FOSTER PEACE? 
 
43 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES share of months in which a district had at least one casualty 
              
power sharing -0.312*** -0.192** -0.166** -0.414*** -0.240** -0.173 
 
(0.0929) (0.0826) (0.0814) (0.128) (0.118) (0.115) 
seat share of 
catholic parties 
   
-0.352 0.139 0.815** 
    
(0.348) (0.272) (0.365) 
seat share of 
non-sectarian 
parties 
   
-0.941** -0.342 0.316 
    
(0.441) (0.355) (0.418) 
              
district fixed 
effects yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes Yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.558 0.465 0.400 0.400 0.395 0.429 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the share of months in which a district 
had at least one casualty. "Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average vote share for sectarian protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 
0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
Table A13. Robustness to dependent variable being the share of months in which a district had at least one casualty 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita (killed by loyalist paramilitaries) 
              
power sharing -0.0449*** -0.0407** -0.0313* -0.0590*** -0.0562** -0.0493* 
 
(0.0143) (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0187) (0.0237) (0.0252) 
seat share of catholic 
parties 
   
0.0315 0.0517 0.0991 
    
(0.0587) (0.0612) (0.0961) 
seat share of 
protestant parties 
   
-0.126** -0.112 -0.0638 
    
(0.0634) (0.0691) (0.0935) 
       district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.180 0.129 0.180 0.069 0.002 0.077 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties caused by loyalist paramilitary groups 
per 1000 population. "Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) 
and an average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
Table A14. Explaining casualties killed by loyalist paramilitaries 
  




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita (killed by republican paramilitaries) 
              
power sharing -0.0606*** -0.0677** -0.0638* -0.0690** -0.0727* -0.0775 
 
(0.0227) (0.0285) (0.0327) (0.0285) (0.0387) (0.0495) 
seat share of catholic 
parties 
   
0.148** 0.171** 0.332** 
    
(0.0732) (0.0806) (0.139) 
seat share of 
protestant parties 
   
-0.0704 -0.0486 0.0630 
    
(0.0953) (0.112) (0.164) 
       district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.365 0.339 0.266 0.362 0.349 0.266 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties caused by republican paramilitary 
groups per 1000 population. "Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 
0.5+0.2) and an average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
 
Table A15. Explaining casualties killed by republican paramilitaries 
  




  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 20 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 15 
percent 
districts with a 
bandwidth of 10 
percent 
VARIABLES casualties per capita (killed by state forces) 
              
power sharing -0.0122** -0.0123** -0.00838 -0.0126** -0.0119 -0.00473 
 
(0.00477) (0.00606) (0.00746) (0.00556) (0.00768) (0.00958) 
seat share of catholic 
parties 
   
-0.0144 -0.0104 0.0215 
    
(0.0210) (0.0241) (0.0345) 
seat share of 
protestant parties 
   
-0.00428 0.00361 0.0310 
    
(0.0233) (0.0259) (0.0351) 
       district fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
observations 286 267 173 286 267 173 
R-squared 0.223 0.229 0.379 0.221 0.233 0.392 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is casualties caused by state forces per 1000 
population. "Bandwidth of 20 percent" is defined by an average seat share for protestant parties within a range 0.3 to 0.7 (0.5-0.2 to 0.5+0.2) and an 
average share for non-sectarian parties below 0.2. Other bandwidths are defined analogously.  
 
Table A16. Explaining casualties killed by state forces 
 
